

The Politics of Punishment:
Why Dictators Join the International Criminal Court

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Online Appendix: Empirics

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1 H1: Political Competition Increases Joining


1.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Models (1)–(6)

Variable	Models (1)–(2): Polity			Models (3)–(4): V-Dem 0.4			Models (5)–(6): V-Dem 0.5			
	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	N
Year	2007	1998	2018	2007	1998	2018	2007	1998	2018	1,277
ICC join	0.03	0	1	0.03	0	1	0.02	0	1	1,277
Political competition	2.08	0	4	2.04	0	4	2.21	0	4	1,191
Multiparty elections [†]	-0.50	-3.35	1.66	-0.74	-3.35	1.57	-0.43	-3.35	1.73	1,103
Log(GDP per capita)	7.90	5.23	11.15	7.92	5.23	11.15	7.87	5.23	11.15	1,190
Rule of law	-0.71	-2.61	1.84	-0.73	-2.61	1.84	-0.82	-2.61	1.84	1,277
Total violence	0.81	0	7	0.87	0	7	0.86	0	7	1,277
Inter-state violence	0.09	0	6	0.07	0	6	0.08	0	6	1,277
Intra-state violence	0.72	0	7	0.80	0	7	0.78	0	7	1,277
Foreign aid*	19.31	-21.41	24.66	19.10	-21.41	24.66	19.34	-21.41	24.66	1,175
Africa	0.46	0	1	0.45	0	1	0.45	0	1	1,277
Middle East/North Africa	0.23	0	1	0.25	0	1	0.22	0	1	1,277
Asia	0.26	0	1	0.26	0	1	0.28	0	1	1,277
Central & South America	0.05	0	1	0.03	0	1	0.05	0	1	1,277

[†]online appendix only *hyperbolic sine transformation

1.2 Permutations of Control Variables



A = Political Competition only; B = Political Competition + Economic controls; C = Political Competition + Rule of Law; D = Political Competition + Violence; E = Political Competition + Regional fixed effects; F = Political Competition + All Controls

Black circle = coefficient estimate; Solid line = 90 percent confidence interval; Dashed line = 95 percent confidence interval; Dotted line = 99 percent confidence interval

1.3 Robustness Checks

Table A2: Multiparty Elections and Continuous Exposure

	Dependent Variable: Years to Join					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Explanatory Variable</i>						
Multiparty elections	0.61*** (0.22)	0.60*** (0.22)	0.65** (0.28)	0.65** (0.28)	0.52** (0.23)	0.52** (0.23)
<i>Control Variables</i>						
GDP per capita, logged	-0.47* (0.26)	-0.47* (0.26)	-0.81** (0.34)	-0.81** (0.35)	-0.46* (0.26)	-0.47* (0.26)
Foreign aid	0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Rule of law	0.62 (0.45)	0.62 (0.45)	0.57 (0.60)	0.58 (0.61)	0.44 (0.49)	0.45 (0.49)
Violence: total	0.07 (0.13)		0.01 (0.16)		0.08 (0.13)	
Violence: intra-state		-0.06 (0.52)		-0.03 (0.54)		-0.04 (0.51)
Violence: inter-state		-0.30 (0.61)		-0.19 (0.60)		-0.18 (6.11)
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dataset	Polity-5	Polity-5	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.5	V-Dem-0.5
Events	29	29	17	17	25	25
States	83	83	71	71	87	87
Observations (state-year)	891	891	747	747	969	969

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Political Competition and New Exposure

	Dependent Variable: Years to Join					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Explanatory Variable</i>						
Political competition	0.65** (0.28)	0.61** (0.29)	0.81** (0.41)	0.80* (0.42)	0.48* (0.28)	0.46 (0.28)
<i>Control Variables</i>						
GDP per capita, logged	-0.51* (0.31)	-0.57* (0.32)	-0.60 (0.37)	-0.62 (0.39)	-0.42 (0.28)	-0.46 (0.29)
Foreign aid	0.03 (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Rule of law	0.77 (0.51)	0.85 (0.53)	0.36 (0.61)	0.38 (0.63)	0.42 (0.53)	0.47 (0.54)
Violence: total	0.00 (0.16)		-0.10 (0.23)		-0.07 (0.18)	
Violence: intra-state		0.07 (0.18)		-0.08 (0.26)		-0.03 (0.20)
Violence: inter-state		-0.34 (0.62)		-0.18 (0.59)	-	0.29 (0.59)
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dataset	Polity-5	Polity-5	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.5	V-Dem-0.5
Events	22	22	12	12	19	19
States	84	84	74	74	91	91
Observations (state-year)	932	932	809	809	1,016	1,016

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Multiparty Elections and New Exposure

Dependent Variable: Years to Join						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Explanatory Variable</i>						
Multiparty elections	0.60*** (0.22)	0.59*** (0.22)	0.75*** (0.29)	0.75** (0.30)	0.51** (0.22)	0.49** (0.23)
<i>Control Variables</i>						
GDP per capita, logged	-0.51** (0.26)	-0.52** (0.26)	-0.87** (0.35)	-0.87** (0.35)	-0.51** (0.25)	-0.52** (0.25)
Foreign aid	0.03 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Rule of law	0.68 (0.46)	0.69 (0.46)	0.64 (0.60)	0.64 (0.60)	0.46 (0.49)	0.48 (0.50)
Violence: total	0.06 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.17)		0.05 (0.13)	
Violence: intra-state		0.07 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.18)		0.07 (0.14)
Violence: inter-state		-0.06 (0.53)		0.00 (0.54)		-0.11 (0.52)
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dataset	Polity-5	Polity-5	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.5	V-Dem-0.5
Events	29	29	17	17	25	25
States	83	83	71	71	87	87
Observations (state-year)	891	891	747	747	969	969

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

2 H2: Joining Decreases Violence

The inclusion of a state into H2 is defined based on the inclusion rule for H1. Any state that joins the ICC as a dictatorship (defined using either the Polity, V-Dem 0.4, or V-Dem 0.5 cutoff) is included in the sample for H2. Thus the numbers are slightly different across each set of models.


2.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A5: Descriptive Statistics for Models (7)-(12)

Variable	Models (7)-(8): Polity			Models (9)-(10): V-Dem 0.4			Models (11)-(12): V-Dem 0.5					
	Mean	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Min.	Max.	N
Total violence	0.69	0	7	651	0.89	0	7	399	0.80	0	7	559
Intra-state violence	0.68	0	7	651	0.88	0	7	399	0.79	0	7	559
PRIO violence [†]	0.34	0	4	651	0.42	0	4	399	0.36	0	4	559
Post-join	0.77	0	1	651	0.77	0	1	399	0.76	0	1	559
Log(GDP per capita)	6.95	5.35	7.52	625	9.54	5.35	24.23	373	9.50	5.35	24.46	533
Rule of law	-0.75	-2.13	0.46	651	-0.90	-2.13	0.46	399	-0.85	-2.13	0.46	559
Foreign aid*	20.71	-17.05	23.89	651	20.34	-17.05	23.36	399	20.63	-17.05	23.89	559
Polity	1.89	-7	8	617	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polyarchy	-	-	-	-	0.34	0.07	0.77	399	0.37	0.07	0.77	559
Africa	0.45	0	1	651	0.74	0	1	399	0.77	0	1	559
Middle East/North Africa	0.26	0	1	651	0.11	0	1	399	0.08	0	1	559

[†]online appendix only *hyperbolic sine transformation

2.2 Permutations of Control Variables



A = Post-Join only; B = Post-Join + Economic controls; C = Post-Join + Rule of Law; D = Post-Join + Regime score; E = Post-Join + Regional fixed effects; F = Post-Join+ All Controls

Black circle = coefficient estimate; Solid line = 90 percent confidence interval; Dashed line = 95 percent confidence interval

2.3 Robustness Checks

Table A6: Joining the ICC Decreases PRIO Violence

Dependent Variable: Violence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Explanatory Variable</i>			
Post-join	-0.53** (0.26)	-1.35*** (0.33)	-0.59** (0.26)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
GDP per capita, logged	-0.36** (0.18)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Foreign aid	0.71*** (0.13)	1.17*** (0.16)	0.92*** (0.13)
Rule of law	-1.69*** (0.24)	-1.70*** (0.29)	-2.03*** (0.27)
Polity	-0.07** (0.03)		
Polyarchy (V-Dem)		-3.49*** (1.37)	-4.50*** (1.16)
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dataset	Polity-5	V-Dem-0.4	V-Dem-0.5
States	30	19	27
Observations (state-year)	592	373	533

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3 H3: Joining Increases Leader Survival

The inclusion of a state into H3 is defined based on the inclusion rule for H1. Any state that joins the ICC as a dictatorship (defined using either the Polity, V-Dem 0.4, or V-Dem 0.5 cutoff) is included in the sample for H3. Thus the numbers are slightly different across each set of models.


3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A7: Descriptive Statistics for Models (13)–(15)

Variable	Model (13): Polity			Models (14): V-Dem 0.4			Model (15): V-Dem 0.5			
	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	N
Post-join	0.77	0	1	0.76	0	1	0.75	0	1	601
Out of office	0.13	0	1	0.07	0	1	0.08	0	1	601
Tenure year	7.64	0	46	10.46	0	46	8.38	0	46	601
Log(GDP per capita)	6.73	5.35	9.38	9.62	5.35	24.23	9.51	5.35	24.46	573
Rule of law	-0.73	-2.13	0.46	-0.86	-2.13	0.46	-0.80	-2.13	0.46	601
Total violence	0.67	0	7	0.83	0	7	0.75	0	7	601
Inter-state violence	0.01	0	1	0.02	0	1	0.01	0	1	601
Intra-state violence	0.66	0	7	0.82	0	7	0.73	0	7	601
Foreign aid*	20.74	-17.05	23.89	20.36	-17.05	23.36	20.62	-17.05	23.89	601
Polity	2.09	-7	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polyarchy	-	-	-	0.34	0.07	0.77	0.38	0.07	0.77	601
Africa	0.79	0	1	0.72	0	1	0.77	0	1	601
Middle East/North Africa	0.06	0	1	0.12	0	1	0.08	0	1	601
Asia	0.12	0	1	0.16	0	1	0.15	0	1	601

*hyperbolic sine transformation

3.2 Permutations of Control Variables



A = Post-Join only; B = Post-Join + Economic controls; C = Post-Join + Violence; D = Post-Join + Regime score; E = Post-Join + Regional fixed effects; F = Post-Join+ All Controls
 Black circle = coefficient estimate; Solid line = 90 percent confidence interval; Dashed line = 95 percent confidence interval