

# Migration and the Demand for Transnational Justice

January 2022


## Online Appendix: Empirics

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
Descriptive data on stages of universal jurisdiction

Figure A1: Universal Jurisdiction Investigations, 1957–2017




Note: This figure shows the distribution of INVESTIGATIONS, with a loess line to depict the general trend over time.

Figure A2: Universal Jurisdiction Formal Proceedings, 1957–2017




Note: This figure shows the distribution of FORMAL PROCEEDINGS, with a loess line to depict the general trend over time.

Figure A3: Universal Jurisdiction Arrests, 1957–2017



Note: This figure shows the distribution of ARRESTS, with a loess line to depict the general trend over time.

Figure A4: Universal Jurisdiction Trials, 1957–2017



Note: This figure shows the distribution of TRIALS, with a loess line to depict the general trend over time.

## Robustness to Alternative Migration Measures

We use several different migration measures. First, we examine the UN Population Division’s migrant stock data. This data is available for 1990–2019 at five year intervals and we linearly interpolate the data for the years in between.

Second, we also examine migrant flows, which are the number of migrants entering a receiving state from a sending state in a given year, in case the arrival of new migrants is more salient than the overall migrant stock. For this analysis, we begin with migrant flow data from Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014) and updated by Leblang and Helms (Forthcoming). This data—which we call FLT—includes all OECD members as receiving states and all states as sending states for 1970–2016. The data are collected from the United Nations, Eurostate, the OECD, and national statistics bureaus. In some robustness checks, we use the FLT measure of annual immigrant flows. Because yearly inflows may not represent recent migrants well, we create two additional variables from the FLT data: IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 5 YEARS (FLT), which sums the immigration flows for the last 5 years, and IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 10 YEARS (FLT), which does the same for the last 10 years. Next, we construct similar measures using the immigrant flow data from the DEMIG C2C dataset (DEMIG, 2015), which we denote as IMMIGRANT FLOW (DEMIG). This flow data is available for 34 receiving states and most sending states for 1946–2011. It is compiled from the United Nations Population Division, national statistics agencies, and various historical records. Similar to the FLT data we create an IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 5 YEARS (DEMIG) and IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 10 YEARS (DEMIG) variable. To test this alternative explanation, we replicate our results using several alternative measures in figure A5.


Third, we consider the impact of stocks of refugees, which are migrants who demonstrate that they were persecuted in the sending state. For our first measure of refugees (REFUGEE STOCK), we use data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has extensive missing data. For our second two measures of refugees (REFUGEE STOCK (INTERPOLATED) and REFUGEE STOCK (LASSO)), we use the two imputed measures from Marbach (2018). Finally, we consider the ECONOMIC MIGRANT STOCK, which we calculate as the migrant stock minus the refugee stock (lasso).

Each panel in Figure A5 shows the coefficient estimates of each migration variable from separate regressions. Each panel begins with the coefficient estimate from the MIGRANT STOCK measure in our main analysis. In panels (a) and (b), it displays the coefficient estimate for this same measure when receiving state fixed effects are included; fixed effects measures are not included in


panels (c) and (d) as they would restrict our analysis to states with at least one universal jurisdiction case, leading to selection bias. Each panel then displays the coefficient estimate from each of our ten alternative measures of migration. For each measure, a marker represents the point estimate, while the thick (thin) bars represent the 95% (90%) confidence interval. Each panel includes a dotted vertical line is at 0. So coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels. We then repeated this exercise using control variables. Regardless of which migration measure that we use, the effect of migration is almost always positive and significant at conventional levels.

Figure A5: Effect of Alternative Migration Measures on ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION


(a) ANY INITIATION excluding controls




(b) ANY INITIATION including controls



(c) FIRST INITIATION excluding controls



(d) FIRST INITIATION including controls




This figure plots the coefficients for different measures of migration from separate regressions. Each regression replicates Model 1 or 3, respectively, from our main results but replaces migrant stock with another measure. Dots represent the point estimates, thick bars represent the 90% confidence interval, and thin bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The dotted vertical line is at 0. Coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels.



## Alternative lag structures for atrocity measures

Figure A6: Comparing the Impact of Alternative Lag Structures




Note: This graph plots the coefficients on the different measures of democracy and political terror, respectively. The coefficients come from regressions that replicate Model 1 but replace the atrocity variables for both democracy and political terror.

## Examining the non-interpolated data at the decade mark

We also examine whether the effects of migration are driven by the imputation of migration data. We regress an indicator of whether there were any initiations in the decade on the values from the start of the decade. For example, DV takes a value 1 if there was any initiation from 1970 through 1979. We then regress that on the level of migration and the rest of the variables from 1970 and drop all the years in between. Table A1 and Figure A7 present the results of dropping all data except the decade mark.

Figure A7: The effect of migration on initiation of UJ cases sequentially adding additional controls; only for data at the decade mark



This figure plots the coefficient on `MIGRANT STOCKS` from separate regressions. Each regresses any or first initiation on migration but sequentially adds in additional variables. All regressions with the first initiation include years since 1957, its square, and cube. Dots represent the point estimates and bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The dotted vertical line is at 0. Coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels.

Table A1: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables at the Decade

|                                    | Any                   |                       |                     | First RS             |  |  |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--|--|
|                                    | All Model 1           | No J. Doe Model 2     | All Model 3         | No J. Doe Model 4    |  |  |
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| Migrant Stock                      | 0.00084** (0.00029)   | 0.00084** (0.00029)   | 0.00048** (0.00019) | 0.00062*** (0.00016) |  |  |
| <b>Atrocities (SS)</b>             |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.0037*** (0.00066)   | 0.0037*** (0.00066)   | 0.00057 (0.00037)   | 0.00096*** (0.00026) |  |  |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.0059*** (0.0016)   | -0.0059*** (0.0016)   | -0.0027* (0.0011)   | -0.0018* (0.00073)   |  |  |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| Democracy (RS)                     | -0.0038** (0.0013)    | -0.0038** (0.0013)    | -0.0014 (0.0011)    | 0.00064 (0.00072)    |  |  |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.0018*** (0.00047)  | -0.0018*** (0.00047)  | -0.00074* (0.00034) | -0.00041 (0.00023)   |  |  |
| Center (RS)                        | -0.00078 (0.0014)     | -0.00078 (0.0014)     | -0.00028 (0.0011)   | -0.00081 (0.00063)   |  |  |
| Left (RS)                          | -0.00020 (0.0013)     | -0.00020 (0.0013)     | -0.00030 (0.00076)  | 0.00027 (0.00056)    |  |  |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.0044*** (0.0011)    | 0.0044*** (0.0011)    | 0.0012 (0.00069)    | 0.00076* (0.00035)   |  |  |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | 0.0042*** (0.0011)    | 0.0042*** (0.0011)    | 0.00087 (0.00075)   | 0.00031 (0.00035)    |  |  |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | -0.0042** (0.0014)    | -0.0042** (0.0014)    | -0.00075 (0.00098)  | -0.0011** (0.00042)  |  |  |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | 0.00047 (0.00057)     | 0.00047 (0.00057)     | 0.00039 (0.00047)   |                      |  |  |
| OECD (RS)                          | 0.0026* (0.0010)      | 0.0026* (0.0010)      | 0.0011 (0.00079)    |                      |  |  |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              | 0.17 (0.11)           | 0.17 (0.11)           |                     |                      |  |  |
| Prior Success (RS)                 | 0.016 (0.011)         | 0.016 (0.011)         |                     |                      |  |  |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | 0.00057 (0.00041)     | 0.00057 (0.00041)     | -0.00029 (0.00025)  |                      |  |  |
| Trade                              | 0.0028* (0.0012)      | 0.0028* (0.0012)      | 0.00099 (0.0010)    |                      |  |  |
| Alliance                           | -0.0047 (0.0026)      | -0.0047 (0.0026)      | 0.00024 (0.0022)    |                      |  |  |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.026* (0.010)       | -0.026* (0.010)       | -0.0069 (0.0094)    |                      |  |  |
| Major Power (SS)                   | 0.035*** (0.0090)     | 0.035*** (0.0090)     | 0.011* (0.0057)     |                      |  |  |
| Shared language                    | 0.0072** (0.0026)     | 0.0072** (0.0026)     | 0.0018 (0.0018)     |                      |  |  |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |                       |                       |                     |                      |  |  |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.00018*** (0.000049) | 0.00018*** (0.000049) | 0.000050 (0.000039) | 0.000026 (0.000015)  |  |  |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | 0.038* (0.015)        | 0.038* (0.015)        | 0.012 (0.010)       | 0.0019 (0.0019)      |  |  |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.0032 (0.0027)      | -0.0032 (0.0027)      | -0.0011 (0.0014)    | -0.0011 (0.00074)    |  |  |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | 0.028* (0.013)        | 0.028* (0.013)        | 0.014 (0.012)       | 0.021* (0.0089)      |  |  |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.0016 (0.0012)      | -0.0016 (0.0012)      | -0.0010 (0.00078)   | -0.00083 (0.00051)   |  |  |
| Distance                           | 0.0000047 (0.00076)   | 0.0000047 (0.00076)   | 0.000098 (0.00048)  | 0.00070* (0.00034)   |  |  |
| Cold War                           | 0.000078 (0.0011)     | 0.000078 (0.0011)     |                     | 0.0027** (0.0010)    |  |  |
| Observations                       | 16604                 | 16604                 | 15146               | 30323                |  |  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.049                 | 0.049                 | 0.012               | 0.011                |  |  |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. Contiguity variables included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Sensitivity Analysis

We have shown, thus, that migration robustly predicts universal jurisdiction cases and the steps to and through trial. We have also shown that migration robustly predicts the first time that a receiving state uses universal jurisdiction. This suggests that there is unlikely to be reverse causation, unless the migrants know of some unobservable characteristic of the state that will lead it to use universal jurisdiction. While we have controlled for explanations in the literature, we now turn to sensitivity analysis to help understand what additional threats to inference there may be.

To examine the sensitivity of MIGRANT STOCK, we examine how large an unobserved confounder would need to be to change our results using the procedure in Cinelli and Hazlett (2020). Assume that there is an unobserved confounder such that our estimate of the effect of MIGRANT STOCK is greater than 0 but the true effect is 0. In this case, our estimated coefficient would be biased. Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) show that this bias can be calculated from the amount of variation ( $R^2$ ) that the confounder explains in both the outcome and explanatory variables. Their procedure then allows us to calculate how much variation this confounder must explain such that the bias in our estimate is large enough that the true estimate is 0. It also allows us to examine how large a hypothetical confounder would need to be in comparison to other variables.

We examine the sensitivity in the following way. For ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION, we examine the sensitivity of the estimate in Model 1 and 3, respectively, from our main analysis (Table 3), using the DEMOCRACY (SS) as our benchmark.<sup>1</sup> We use DEMOCRACY (SS) as it has a large effect on both universal jurisdiction initiations and MIGRANT STOCK.<sup>2</sup>

We compare the effect of a hypothetical confounder to our benchmark of DEMOCRACY (SS) in Figure A8. The red line shows when the point estimate on MIGRANT STOCK would equal zero. A confounder would have to have as large an effect as that of three times DEMOCRACY (SS) for ANY INITIATION and four times DEMOCRACY (SS) for FIRST INITIATION to decrease the size of the coefficient on MIGRANT STOCK to zero. A hypothetical confounder that had 3 times the effect of DEMOCRACY (SS) would have to explain about 25% of the remaining variation in MIGRANT STOCK, but all the variables already explain 63% of the variation. Thus, an unobserved confounder would have to have quite a large effect on *both* universal jurisdiction cases and migration to reduce the effect of migration to zero. It is unlikely that such a confounder exists.

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<sup>1</sup>We estimate the sensitivity parameters using **sensemakr** (Cinelli, Ferwerda and Hazlett, 2020) in stata.

<sup>2</sup>Using standardized coefficients, DEMOCRACY (SS) has the second largest effect on the outcome, after MIGRANT STOCK. It also has a large effect on MIGRANT STOCK, when MIGRANT STOCK is regressed on DEMOCRACY (SS) and other controls.


Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis

| Outcome: ANY CASE   |   |        |         |                               |            |
|---------------------|---|--------|---------|-------------------------------|------------|
| Treatment:          | Est.  | S.E.   | t(H0=0) | $R_{Y \sim D   \mathbf{X}}^2$ | $RV_{q=1}$ |
| MIGRANT STOCK       | 0.0001  | 0.0000 | 4.59    | .01%                          | 1.14 %     |
| df = 161530         | BOUND 1X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 8.47\%$    |        |         |                               |            |
|                     | BOUND 2X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .02\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 16.94\%$   |        |         |                               |            |
|                     | BOUND 3X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .03\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 25.41\%$   |        |         |                               |            |
| Outcome: FIRST CASE |   |        |         |                               |            |
| Treatment:          | Est.  | S.E.   | t(H0=0) | $R_{Y \sim D   \mathbf{X}}^2$ | $RV_{q=1}$ |
| MIGRANT STOCK       | 0.0001  | 0.0000 | 4.22    | .01%                          | 1.12 %     |
| df = 141768         | BOUND (1X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 8.84\%$  |        |         |                               |            |
|                     | BOUND (2X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 17.68\%$ |        |         |                               |            |
|                     | BOUND (3X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z   \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .02\%$ , $R_{D \sim Z   \mathbf{X}}^2 = 26.53\%$ |        |         |                               |            |

This table displays the results of the sensitivity analysis. The quantity  $R_{Y \sim D | \mathbf{X}}^2$  shows what happens in an extreme case in which a confounder that is orthogonal to all the covariates and also explains 100% of the residual variance of ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION (RS). In this extreme case, the unobserved confounder would have to explain 0.03% and 0.02%, respectively, of the residual variance of MIGRANT STOCK. The rest of the covariates already explain 62% of the variation on MIGRANT STOCK. Perhaps, it is possible that such an extreme confounder exists.

The quantity  $RV_{q=1}$  is the robustness value and shows that unobserved confounders (orthogonal to the covariates) that explain more than 1.57% for ANY INITIATION and 1.26% for FIRST INITIATION of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome are strong enough to bring the point estimate to 0 (a bias of 100 percent of the original estimate). This may not seem like a lot but it is very difficult to predict these cases because they are so rare: the  $R^2$  of the regression on ANY INITIATION is 0.026 and on FIRST INITIATION is 0.0007. Thus this confounder would have to explain more than half the variation of ANY INITIATION and 26 times more variation of FIRST INITIATION than is currently explained.

Figure A8: Sensitivity of Migration Effect to Confounders



This figure plots the coefficient on MIGRANT STOCK from a regression of ANY INITIATION (Table 3 Model 1) and FIRST INITIATION (Table 3 Model 3) given the inclusion of a hypothetical confounder that is one to three or four times as strong as DEMOCRACY (SS), respectively. The x- and y-axes are expressed in the partial  $R^2$  of the treatment (MIGRANT STOCK) and the outcome (ANY INITIATION or FIRST INITIATION) and the red line is when the point estimate would be equal to zero.

### Examining later case stages

Table A3: Regressions of Case Stages using MIGRANT STOCK

|                                    | Initiation  | Investigations | Formal Proceedings | Arrests    | Trials      |
|------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |             |                |                    |            |             |
| Migrant Stock                      | 0.00013**   | 0.000030       | 0.0000071          | -0.0000021 | 0.0000047   |
| <b>Atrocities (SS)</b>             |             |                |                    |            |             |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.00040***  | 0.00012*       | 0.000058           | 0.000023   | 0.0000026   |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.00078*** | -0.000079      | 0.0000029          | 0.000098   | 0.0000028   |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |             |                |                    |            |             |
| Democracy (RS)                     | -0.00039**  | -0.000044      | -0.0000047         | -0.000072  | -0.0000048  |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.00023*** | -0.000022      | 0.0000088          | -0.000032  | -0.0000020  |
| Center (RS)                        | -0.00015    | -0.000023      | -0.000047          | -0.000030  | -0.0000060  |
| Left (RS)                          | -0.00018    | 0.000059       | 0.000011           | 0.000019   | -0.0000052  |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.00069**   | 0.00024        | 0.00013            | 0.000012   | 0.0000034   |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | 0.00036**   | -0.000042      | -0.000064          | -0.000093  | -0.0000048  |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | -0.00063*** | -0.00012       | -0.000041          | 0.000013   | 0.0000053   |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |             |                |                    |            |             |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | 0.00020     | 0.000039       | 0.000064**         | 0.000060*  | 0.0000085   |
| OECD (RS)                          | 0.00019     | 0.00013**      | 0.00012*           | 0.00011*   | 0.000038    |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              | 0.070**     | 0.092***       | 0.084***           | 0.060***   | 0.033**     |
| Prior Success (RS)                 | 0.00011     | -0.00014*      | -0.00014*          | -0.00014** | -0.000068   |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |             |                |                    |            |             |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | 0.00012**   | 0.000013       | -0.0000091         | -0.000024  | -0.0000023  |
| Trade                              | 0.00025     | 0.00016        | 0.00013            | 0.00011    | 0.000036    |
| Alliance                           | -0.00069*   | -0.000097      | 0.000096           | 0.00031    | 0.00012     |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.0016     | 0.0000012      | 0.00033            | 0.00039    | -0.00028    |
| Major Power (SS)                   | -0.00096*   | -0.000077      | 0.00034            | 0.00056    | 0.000096    |
| Shared language                    | 0.0010*     | 0.0000031      | -0.000028          | -0.00012   | -0.00017    |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |             |                |                    |            |             |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.000011**  | -0.00000039    | -0.0000016         | -0.0000011 | 0.000000078 |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | 0.0061      | 0.0035         | 0.0025             | 0.0019     | 0.0013      |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.00087*   | -0.00053*      | -0.00029           | -0.00028   | -0.00024    |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | 0.0026      | 0.0019         | 0.0018             | 0.00099    | 0.0012      |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.00036*   | 0.000079       | 0.000091           | 0.00010    | 0.000066    |
| Distance                           | 0.00022*    | 0.000065       | 0.000046           | 0.000043   | 0.000019    |
| Cold War                           | -0.000020   | -0.000056      | -0.00012*          | -0.00010   | 0.000060    |
| War on Terror                      | -0.00017    | -0.00023       | -0.00022           | -0.000094  | -0.000015   |
| Observations                       | 161213      | 161213         | 161213             | 161213     | 161213      |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.026       | 0.068          | 0.066              | 0.051      | 0.034       |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Regressions of Case Stages using REFUGEE STOCK

|                                    | Initiation | Investigations | Formal Proceedings | Arrests    | Trials     |
|------------------------------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |            |
| Refugee stock                      | 0.00041    | 0.00023        | 0.00015            | 0.00019    | 0.00015    |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.0020***  | 0.00064*       | 0.00044            | 0.00022    | 0.0000052  |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.0052*** | -0.00043       | 0.000086           | 0.00071    | 0.000036   |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |            |
| Democracy (RS)                     | 0.0049     | 0.0026         | 0.0025             | 0.000076   | -0.00017   |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.0012*   | -0.00023       | -0.000081          | -0.00021   | -0.00013   |
| Center (RS)                        | 0.0015     | 0.00078        | 0.00058            | 0.00066    | -0.00032   |
| Left (RS)                          | 0.0012     | 0.00086        | 0.0010             | 0.00060    | -0.00041   |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.0024*    | 0.00079        | 0.00053            | 0.00051    | -0.00012   |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | 0.0022     | -0.00012       | -0.00026           | -0.00041   | -0.00041   |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | -0.0038*   | -0.0017        | -0.0015            | -0.0014    | -0.00023   |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |            |                |                    |            |            |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | -0.00026   | 0.0000060      | 0.000029           | 0.00022    | -0.000018  |
| OECD (RS)                          | 0.0013     | 0.00014        | -0.000064          | -0.00024   | -0.00014   |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              | 0.057*     | 0.082***       | 0.067***           | 0.043***   | 0.027*     |
| Prior Success (RS)                 | -0.0025    | -0.0024        | -0.0013            | -0.0015    | -0.00097   |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |            |                |                    |            |            |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | 0.0011***  | 0.000018       | -0.000052          | -0.00021   | -0.00021   |
| Trade                              | -0.0041    | -0.0040*       | -0.0039*           | -0.0027*   | -0.0020*   |
| Alliance                           | 0.000052   | -0.00019       | -0.00041           | 0.000097   | 0.00070    |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.0013    | 0.00095        | 0.0016             | 0.0018     | -0.00090   |
| Major Power (SS)                   | -0.0035*   | -0.0018        | -0.0012            | -0.00022   | 0.00019    |
| Shared language                    | 0.0062**   | 0.00078        | 0.00041            | -0.00018   | -0.00090   |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |            |                |                    |            |            |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.000026** | 0.0000096      | -0.0000010         | 0.00000041 | 0.00000021 |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | 0.0074     | 0.0049         | 0.0032             | 0.0028     | 0.0024     |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.0044**  | -0.0026**      | -0.0017*           | -0.0015*   | -0.0011    |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | 0.0056     | 0.0053         | 0.0051             | 0.0028     | 0.0043     |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.0015    | 0.00074        | 0.00096            | 0.0012**   | 0.00064*   |
| Distance                           | 0.0022***  | 0.00088*       | 0.00063            | 0.00027    | 0.00023    |
| Cold War                           | -0.0014*   | -0.0011        | -0.00083           | -0.00044   | -0.00021   |
| War on Terror                      | 0.00010    | -0.00060       | 0.00025            | 0.00040    | 0.00033    |
| Observations                       | 21856      | 21856          | 21856              | 21856      | 21856      |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.029      | 0.062          | 0.052              | 0.036      | 0.031      |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table A5: Regressions of First Case Stages using MIGRANT STOCK

|                                    | Initiation | Investigations | Formal Proceedings | Arrests    | Trials      |
|------------------------------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |             |
| Migrant Stock                      | 0.000048*  | -0.000016      | (0.000010)         | 0.000015   | (0.0000084) |
| <b>Atrocities (SS)</b>             |            |                |                    |            |             |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.000027   | 0.000094       | (0.000022)         | 0.000025   | (0.000012)  |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.00020   | 0.000086       | (0.000082)         | -0.000031  | (0.000019)  |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |             |
| Democracy (RS)                     | -0.00014   | 0.000030       | (0.000083)         | -0.000052  | (0.000044)  |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.000034  | 0.000021       | (0.000024)         | -0.000026* | (0.000017)  |
| Center (RS)                        | 0.00010    | 0.000015       | (0.00011)          | 0.000014   | (0.000038)  |
| Left (RS)                          | -0.000017  | 0.000047       | (0.000037)         | 0.000032   | (0.000027)  |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.00016    | 0.00010        | (0.00010)          | 0.000012   | (0.000049)  |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | -0.00012   | -0.000039      | (0.000059)         | -0.000028  | (0.000014)  |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | 0.000092   | 0.000053       | (0.000072)         | -0.000028  | (0.000023)  |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |            |                |                    |            |             |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | 0.000021   | -0.000054      | (0.000036)         | 0.000026   | (0.0000054) |
| OECD (RS)                          | -0.000041  | 0.000092       | (0.000066)         | 0.000041   | (0.000022)  |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              |            | 0.33*          | (0.17)             | -0.000079  | (0.000042)  |
| Prior Success (RS)                 |            |                |                    | 0.00033    | (0.00041)   |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |            |                |                    |            |             |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | -0.000012  | -0.0000034     | (0.000070)         | -0.000027  | (0.000016)  |
| Trade                              | 0.00012    | 0.000060       | (0.000067)         | 0.00041    | (0.00024)   |
| Alliance                           | 0.00026    | 0.00022        | (0.00016)          | -0.000038  | (0.000036)  |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.00073   | -0.00048       | (0.00054)          | 0.00038    | (0.00042)   |
| Major Power (SS)                   | -0.00028*  | -0.000017      | (0.000068)         | 0.00033    | (0.00041)   |
| Shared language                    | -0.000043  | 0.000025       | (0.00011)          | -0.000030  | (0.00027)   |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |            |                |                    |            |             |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.0000042  | 0.0000041      | (0.000032)         | 0.000026   | (0.0000016) |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | 0.00047    | 0.0012         | (0.00061)          | 0.00042    | (0.00022)   |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.00016*  | -0.000075      | (0.000066)         | -0.000079  | (0.000042)  |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | 0.00056    | 0.00038        | (0.00051)          | 0.00038    | (0.00063)   |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.00021*  | 0.000023       | (0.000062)         | -0.000020  | (0.000025)  |
| Distance                           | 0.000099   | -0.000056      | (0.000044)         | -0.000033  | (0.000030)  |
| Cold War                           | 0.000086   | 0.00010        | (0.000059)         | 0.000078   | (0.000061)  |
| War on Terror                      | -0.000020  | -0.000083      | (0.00013)          | -0.000073  | (0.000063)  |
| Observations                       | 141403     | 143555         | 281818             | 283668     | 294453      |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.00092    | 0.19           | 0.00058            | 0.00064    | 0.00057     |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Regressions of First Case Stages using REFUGEE STOCK

|                                    | Initiation | Investigations | Formal Proceedings | Arrests    | Trials    |
|------------------------------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|-----------|
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |           |
| Refugee stock                      | 0.00013    | 0.00014        | 0.00020*           | 0.000064*  | 0.00010*  |
| <b>Atrocities (SS)</b>             |            |                |                    |            |           |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.00028    | 0.0000030      | 0.00017            | 0.000038   | -0.000043 |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.0013    | 0.00020        | -0.00018           | -0.00029   | -0.00011  |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |            |                |                    |            |           |
| Democracy (RS)                     | 0.0021     | 0.0027         | 0.00043            | 0.00032    | 0.00012   |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.00039   | -0.00017       | -0.00020*          | (0.000085) | -0.00014  |
| Center (RS)                        | 0.0012     | 0.00032        | 0.00037            | (0.00031)  | 0.00026   |
| Left (RS)                          | 0.00038    | 0.00038        | 0.00025            | (0.00028)  | -0.000056 |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.00056    | 0.00061        | 0.00029            | (0.00056)  | -0.00020  |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | 0.00057    | -0.00076       | 0.00030            | (0.00020)  | 0.00083   |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | 0.00078    | -0.00016       | -0.00070*          | (0.00027)  | -0.00017  |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |            |                |                    |            |           |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | -0.00069   | -0.00057       | (0.00064)          |            | -0.00053* |
| OECD (RS)                          | 0.00032    | 0.00029        | (0.00043)          |            |           |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              |            | 0.25           | (0.14)             |            |           |
| Prior Success (RS)                 |            |                |                    |            |           |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |            |                |                    |            |           |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | 0.00014    | -0.00029       | (0.00014)          |            |           |
| Trade                              | -0.00018   | -0.00071       | (0.0012)           |            |           |
| Alliance                           | 0.0012     | 0.00049        | (0.0012)           |            |           |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.0049    | -0.0018        | (0.0061)           |            |           |
| Major Power (SS)                   | -0.00082   | 0.00032        | (0.00061)          |            |           |
| Shared language                    | 0.00052    | 0.00097        | (0.0012)           |            |           |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |            |                |                    |            |           |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.00021    | 0.0000098      | 0.0000078          | 0.0000059  | 0.0000014 |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | -0.00054   | 0.0021         | 0.0014             | 0.0012*    | 0.0014*   |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.00077   | -0.00076       | -0.00061*          | -0.00020   | -0.00035  |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | -0.00071   | -0.00089       | -0.00079*          | -0.00077*  | 0.0036    |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.00082   | 0.00065        | 0.00023            | -0.00010   | 0.00016   |
| Distance                           | 0.00045    | 0.00023        | -0.00040           | 0.000073   | 0.000093  |
| Cold War                           | -0.0015    | -0.00050       | -0.00014           | -0.00055   | -0.00022  |
| War on Terror                      | -0.0011    | -0.0013        | -0.00050           | 0.00084    | 0.00033   |
| Observations                       | 10668      | 11640          | 25036              | 49219      | 32063     |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.0032     | 0.13           | 0.0025             | 0.0017     | 0.0033    |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Alternative measures for domestic universal jurisdiction legislation

To examine the robustness of our migration controls to alternative measures of domestic legal systems, we used two approaches. First, we included receiving state fixed effects, which control for all time invariant aspects of a state that might affect universal jurisdiction cases. These effects could include aspects of the legal system that do not change over our time span. Second, we performed additional regressions that controlled for whether and what types of international crimes are defined in a receiving state's domestic law using data from Berlin (2020).

Table A7: Regressions of ANY INITIATIONS on Domestic UJ Legislation

|                           |                        |                        |                         |                         |                        |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Migrant Stock             | 0.00013*<br>(0.000052) | 0.00015*<br>(0.000065) | 0.00018**<br>(0.000070) | 0.00013*<br>(0.000054)  | 0.00013*<br>(0.000051) |
| Dom Leg: Genocide         | 0.000100<br>(0.00012)  |                        |                         |                         |                        |
| Dom Leg: War Crimes       |                        | 0.00012<br>(0.00021)   |                         |                         |                        |
| Dom Leg: Humanity         |                        |                        | 0.00035<br>(0.00024)    |                         |                        |
| Dom Leg: Any UJ Crime     |                        |                        |                         | 0.00042***<br>(0.00012) |                        |
| Dom Leg: Sum of UJ Crimes |                        |                        |                         |                         | 0.00012*<br>(0.000057) |
| Observations              | 140615                 | 112564                 | 105352                  | 130791                  | 144737                 |
| $R^2$                     | 0.026                  | 0.028                  | 0.029                   | 0.026                   | 0.026                  |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data are available 1976-2007. Other controls included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Regressions of FIRST INITIATIONS on Domestic UJ Legislation

|                           |                         |                        |                         |                         |                          |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Migrant Stock             | 0.000045<br>(0.000023)  | 0.000047<br>(0.000025) | 0.000067*<br>(0.000032) | 0.000050*<br>(0.000025) | 0.000045*<br>(0.000022)  |
| Dom Leg: Genocide         | -0.000077<br>(0.000056) |                        |                         |                         |                          |
| Dom Leg: War Crimes       |                         | 0.000069<br>(0.000061) |                         |                         |                          |
| Dom Leg: Humanity         |                         |                        | -0.00010<br>(0.000071)  |                         |                          |
| Dom Leg: Any UJ Crime     |                         |                        |                         | -0.000037<br>(0.000059) |                          |
| Dom Leg: Sum of UJ Crimes |                         |                        |                         |                         | -0.0000023<br>(0.000018) |
| Observations              | 120932                  | 94335                  | 87769                   | 111108                  | 125054                   |
| $R^2$                     | 0.0011                  | 0.0012                 | 0.0014                  | 0.0011                  | 0.00100                  |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data are available 1976-2007. Other controls included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables and Receiving State Fixed Effects

|                                    | Any                      |                          |                         | First                   |                         |                         |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                    | All Model 1              | No. J. Doe Model 2       | All Model 3             | All Model 3             | No. J. Doe Model 4      | No. J. Doe Model 4      |
| <b>Migration (SS → RS)</b>         |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| Migrant Stock                      | 0.00014**<br>(0.000051)  | 0.00014**<br>(0.000051)  | 0.000052*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000052*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000052*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000052*<br>(0.000022) |
| <b>Atrocities (SS)</b>             |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS) | 0.00040***<br>(0.000084) | 0.00040***<br>(0.000084) | 0.000029<br>(0.000024)  | 0.000029<br>(0.000024)  | 0.000029<br>(0.000024)  | 0.000029<br>(0.000024)  |
| Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS) | -0.00081***<br>(0.00022) | -0.00081***<br>(0.00022) | -0.00021<br>(0.00011)   | -0.00021<br>(0.00011)   | -0.00021<br>(0.00011)   | -0.00021<br>(0.00011)   |
| <b>Responsiveness (RS)</b>         |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| Democracy (RS)                     | -0.00052**<br>(0.00017)  | -0.00052**<br>(0.00017)  | 0.000022<br>(0.00015)   | 0.000022<br>(0.00015)   | 0.000022<br>(0.00015)   | 0.000022<br>(0.00015)   |
| Population (RS)                    | -0.0021***<br>(0.00047)  | -0.0021***<br>(0.00047)  | 0.00043<br>(0.00043)    | 0.00043<br>(0.00043)    | 0.00043<br>(0.00043)    | 0.00043<br>(0.00043)    |
| Center (RS)                        | 0.00014<br>(0.00014)     | 0.00014<br>(0.00014)     | 0.000091<br>(0.00011)   | 0.000091<br>(0.00011)   | 0.000091<br>(0.00011)   | 0.000091<br>(0.00011)   |
| Left (RS)                          | 0.00012<br>(0.00019)     | 0.00012<br>(0.00019)     | -0.000073<br>(0.000078) | -0.000073<br>(0.000078) | -0.000073<br>(0.000078) | -0.000073<br>(0.000078) |
| Rome Statute (RS)                  | 0.00077**<br>(0.00025)   | 0.00077**<br>(0.00025)   | 0.00017<br>(0.00013)    | 0.00017<br>(0.00013)    | 0.00017<br>(0.00013)    | 0.00017<br>(0.00013)    |
| Private Prosecutions (RS)          | -0.013***<br>(0.0028)    | -0.013***<br>(0.0028)    | 0.0022<br>(0.0024)      | 0.0022<br>(0.0024)      | 0.0022<br>(0.0024)      | 0.0022<br>(0.0024)      |
| British Legal Origin (RS)          | -0.011***<br>(0.0025)    | -0.011***<br>(0.0025)    | 0.0029<br>(0.0025)      | 0.0029<br>(0.0025)      | 0.0029<br>(0.0025)      | 0.0029<br>(0.0025)      |
| <b>Cost (RS)</b>                   |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| GDPpc (RS)                         | 0.000083<br>(0.00025)    | 0.000083<br>(0.00025)    | 0.00040<br>(0.00025)    | 0.00040<br>(0.00025)    | 0.00040<br>(0.00025)    | 0.00040<br>(0.00025)    |
| OECD (RS)                          | -0.0025<br>(0.0037)      | -0.0025<br>(0.0037)      | -0.00059<br>(0.00067)   | -0.00059<br>(0.00067)   | -0.00059<br>(0.00067)   | -0.00059<br>(0.00067)   |
| Prior Initiation (RS)              | 0.069**<br>(0.024)       | 0.069**<br>(0.024)       |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| Prior Success (RS)                 | -0.0015<br>(0.0017)      | -0.0015<br>(0.0017)      |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| <b>Cost (Dyadic)</b>               |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| GDPpc (SS)                         | 0.00013*<br>(0.000051)   | 0.00013*<br>(0.000051)   | 0.0000067<br>(0.000012) | 0.0000067<br>(0.000012) | 0.0000067<br>(0.000012) | 0.0000067<br>(0.000012) |
| Trade                              | 0.00038*<br>(0.00017)    | 0.00038*<br>(0.00017)    | 0.00022<br>(0.00012)    | 0.00022<br>(0.00012)    | 0.00022<br>(0.00012)    | 0.00022<br>(0.00012)    |
| Alliance                           | -0.00028<br>(0.00027)    | -0.00028<br>(0.00027)    | 0.00039<br>(0.00022)    | 0.00039<br>(0.00022)    | 0.00039<br>(0.00022)    | 0.00039<br>(0.00022)    |
| Major Power (RS)                   | -0.0013<br>(0.0022)      | -0.0013<br>(0.0022)      | -0.0040<br>(0.0021)     | -0.0040<br>(0.0021)     | -0.0040<br>(0.0021)     | -0.0040<br>(0.0021)     |
| Major Power (SS)                   | -0.00100*<br>(0.00043)   | -0.00100*<br>(0.00043)   | -0.00028*<br>(0.00011)  | -0.00028*<br>(0.00011)  | -0.00028*<br>(0.00011)  | -0.00028*<br>(0.00011)  |
| Shared language                    | 0.00100*<br>(0.00044)    | 0.00100*<br>(0.00044)    | -0.000038<br>(0.000099) | -0.000038<br>(0.000099) | -0.000038<br>(0.000099) | -0.000038<br>(0.000099) |
| <b>Controls</b>                    |                          |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| NGOs (RS)                          | 0.000014<br>(0.0000086)  | 0.000014<br>(0.0000086)  | 0.000011<br>(0.0000076) | 0.000011<br>(0.0000076) | 0.000011<br>(0.0000076) | 0.000011<br>(0.0000076) |
| International Prosecutions (SS)    | 0.0062<br>(0.0034)       | 0.0062<br>(0.0034)       | 0.00049<br>(0.00062)    | 0.00049<br>(0.00062)    | 0.00049<br>(0.00062)    | 0.00049<br>(0.00062)    |
| Amnesty (SS)                       | -0.00083<br>(0.00043)    | -0.00083<br>(0.00043)    | -0.00016*<br>(0.000071) | -0.00016*<br>(0.000071) | -0.00016*<br>(0.000071) | -0.00016*<br>(0.000071) |
| Former Colony (dyad)               | 0.0022<br>(0.0028)       | 0.0022<br>(0.0028)       | 0.00035<br>(0.00077)    | 0.00035<br>(0.00077)    | 0.00035<br>(0.00077)    | 0.00035<br>(0.00077)    |
| Former Colony (any)                | -0.00038*<br>(0.00018)   | -0.00038*<br>(0.00018)   | -0.00022*<br>(0.000087) | -0.00022*<br>(0.000087) | -0.00022*<br>(0.000087) | -0.00022*<br>(0.000087) |
| Distance                           | 0.00046***<br>(0.00013)  | 0.00046***<br>(0.00013)  | 0.00017*<br>(0.000075)  | 0.00017*<br>(0.000075)  | 0.00017*<br>(0.000075)  | 0.00017*<br>(0.000075)  |
| Cold War                           | -0.00030<br>(0.00016)    | -0.00030<br>(0.00016)    | 0.000087<br>(0.000067)  | 0.000087<br>(0.000067)  | 0.000087<br>(0.000067)  | 0.000087<br>(0.000067)  |
| War on Terror                      | 0.000067<br>(0.00030)    | 0.000067<br>(0.00030)    | 0.0000094<br>(0.00014)  | 0.0000094<br>(0.00014)  | 0.0000094<br>(0.00014)  | 0.0000094<br>(0.00014)  |
| Observations                       | 161213                   | 161213                   | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.026                    | 0.026                    | 0.0015                  | 0.0015                  | 0.0015                  | 0.0015                  |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models

1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. Contiguity variables included

but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Alternative measures of relative power between the sending and receiving state

Table A10: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables with the CINC Ratio

|                    | Any                      |                          | First                      |                            |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|                    | All Model 1              | No J. Doe Model 2        | All Model 3                | No J. Doe Model 4          |
| Migrant Stock      | 0.00011* (0.000048)      | 0.00011* (0.000048)      | 0.000038 (0.000021)        | 0.000038 (0.000021)        |
| CINC ratio (RS/SS) | -0.00000027 (0.00000019) | -0.00000027 (0.00000019) | -0.000000025 (0.000000071) | -0.000000025 (0.000000071) |
| Observations       | 160913                   | 160913                   | 141108                     | 141108                     |
| $R^2$              | 0.025                    | 0.025                    | 0.00086                    | 0.00086                    |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Interaction effect of NGOs and migration

Table A11: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Interaction of Migration and NGOs

|                                  | Any                         |                             |                            | First                      |                            |                            |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|                                  | All Model 1                 | No J. Doe Model 2           | All Model 3                | No J. Doe Model 4          | All Model 3                | No J. Doe Model 4          |
| Migrant Stock                    | 0.00015***<br>(0.000043)    | 0.00015***<br>(0.000043)    | 0.000043<br>(0.000025)     | 0.000043<br>(0.000025)     | 0.000043<br>(0.000025)     | 0.000025<br>(0.000025)     |
| NGOs (RS)                        | 0.000019*<br>(0.0000079)    | 0.000019*<br>(0.0000079)    | 0.0000021<br>(0.0000045)   | 0.0000021<br>(0.0000045)   | 0.0000021<br>(0.0000045)   | 0.0000021<br>(0.0000045)   |
| Migrant Stock $\times$ NGOs (RS) | -0.00000088<br>(0.00000074) | -0.00000088<br>(0.00000074) | 0.00000025<br>(0.00000049) | 0.00000025<br>(0.00000049) | 0.00000025<br>(0.00000049) | 0.00000025<br>(0.00000049) |
| Observations                     | 161213                      | 161213                      | 141403                     | 141403                     | 141403                     | 141403                     |
| $R^2$                            | 0.026                       | 0.026                       | 0.00094                    | 0.00094                    | 0.00094                    | 0.00094                    |

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Diffusion

Finally, we examine whether universal jurisdiction cases diffuse across states in five different ways. First, we include two global time trends, which are coded as the sum of all cases initiated globally and the sum of all trials that have occurred globally. Second, we include two spacial lags. For each year and for each state  $i$ , we calculate  $\sum_j \frac{cases_j}{distance_{ij}}$  using the INITIATION and TRIALS variables separately. Cases that occur in closer states are therefore weighted more than cases in states farther away. We take the sum of each measure over the previous 5 years. Third, we examine the number of cases in the region (minus the cases in the receiving state) in the previous 5 years, defining regions as the Correlates of War project does. Fourth, we examine the number of cases in states that share an official language (minus the cases in the receiving state) in the last five years.<sup>3</sup> Fifth, we examine legal diffusion or the number of cases (trials) in states that share the same legal system in the last five years.

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<sup>3</sup>Language data is from Graham and Tucker (2021).



Table A12: Global Time Trend for INITIATIONS

|                     | Any                         |                             | First                       |                             |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                     | All Model 1                 | No J. Doe Model 2           | All Model 3                 | No J. Doe Model 4           |
| Migrant Stock       | 0.00012*<br>(0.0000048)     | 0.00012*<br>(0.0000048)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.0000022)    | 0.000048*<br>(0.0000022)    |
| Global Trend: Cases | -0.00000082<br>(0.00000043) | -0.00000082<br>(0.00000043) | -0.00000054<br>(0.00000040) | -0.00000054<br>(0.00000040) |
| Observations        | 161213                      | 161213                      | 141403                      | 141403                      |
| $R^2$               | 0.026                       | 0.026                       | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     |

GLOBAL TREND: CASES is the sum of all cases initiated globally. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A13: Global Time Trend for TRIALS

|                      | Any                     |                         |                         |                         | First                   |                         |                         |                         |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                      | All<br>Model 1          | No J. Doe<br>Model 2    | All<br>Model 3          | No J. Doe<br>Model 4    | All<br>Model 3          | No J. Doe<br>Model 4    | All<br>Model 3          | No J. Doe<br>Model 4    |
| Migrant Stock        | 0.00012**<br>(0.000048) | 0.00012**<br>(0.000048) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) |
| Global Trend: Trials | -0.000053<br>(0.000039) | -0.000053<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) | -0.000055<br>(0.000039) |
| Observations         | 161213                  | 161213                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  |
| $R^2$                | 0.026                   | 0.026                   | 0.00096                 | 0.00096                 | 0.00096                 | 0.00096                 | 0.00096                 | 0.00096                 |

GLOBAL TREND: TRIALS is the sum of all trials that have occurred globally. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A14: Spatial Lags for INITIATIONS

|                   | Any                     |                         |                         | First                   |                         |                         |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                   | All Model 1             | No J. Doe Model 2       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       |
| Migrant Stocks    | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048) | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) |
| Spatial Lag Cases | 0.0064*<br>(0.0027)     | 0.0064*<br>(0.0027)     | -0.000074<br>(0.00040)  | -0.000074<br>(0.00040)  | -0.000074<br>(0.00040)  | -0.000074<br>(0.00040)  |
| Observations      | 161213                  | 161213                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  |
| $R^2$             | 0.026                   | 0.026                   | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 |

For each year and for each state  $i$ , we calculate  $\sum_j \frac{initiation_j}{distance_{ij}}$ . Cases that occur in closer states are therefore weighted more than cases in states farther away. SPATIAL LAG CASES is the sum over the previous 5 years. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A15: Spatial Lags for TRIALS

|                    | Any                     |                         |                         | First                   |                         |                         |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                    | All Model 1             | No J. Doe Model 2       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       |
| Migrant Stocks     | 0.00013**<br>(0.000047) | 0.00013**<br>(0.000047) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) |
| Spatial Lag Trials | -0.023<br>(0.091)       | -0.023<br>(0.091)       | 0.0038<br>(0.025)       | 0.0038<br>(0.025)       | 0.0038<br>(0.025)       | 0.0038<br>(0.025)       |
| Observations       | 161213                  | 161213                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  |
| $R^2$              | 0.026                   | 0.026                   | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 |

For each year and for each state  $i$ , we calculate  $\sum_j \frac{trial_{ij}}{distance_{ij}}$ . Cases that occur in closer states are therefore weighted more than cases in states farther away. SPATIAL LAG TRIALS is the sum over the previous 5 years. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A16: Regional Diffusion of INITIATIONS

|                          | Any                       |                           |                           |                           | First                     |                           |                           |                           |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|                          | All Model 1               | No J. Doe Model 2         | All Model 3               | No J. Doe Model 4         | All Model 3               | No J. Doe Model 4         | All Model 3               | No J. Doe Model 4         |
| Migrant Stocks           | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.00048*<br>(0.000022)    |
| Regional Diffusion Cases | -0.0000069<br>(0.0000037) | -0.0000069<br>(0.0000037) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) | -0.0000018<br>(0.0000067) |
| Observations             | 161213                    | 161213                    | 141403                    | 141403                    | 141403                    | 141403                    | 141403                    | 141403                    |
| $R^2$                    | 0.026                     | 0.026                     | 0.00092                   | 0.00092                   | 0.00092                   | 0.00092                   | 0.00092                   | 0.00092                   |

REGIONAL DIFFUSION CASE is the number of initiations in the region (minus the initiations in the receiving state) in the previous 5 years, defining regions as the Correlates of War project does. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A17: Regional Diffusion of TRIALS

|                           | Any                     |                         |                         |                         | First                   |                         |                         |                         |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                           | All Model 1             | No J. Doe Model 2       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       | All Model 3             | No J. Doe Model 4       |
| Migrant Stocks            | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048) | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022) |
| Regional Diffusion Trials | -0.00020<br>(0.00031)   | -0.00020<br>(0.00031)   | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  | -0.00011<br>(0.000053)  |
| Observations              | 161213                  | 161213                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  | 141403                  |
| $R^2$                     | 0.026                   | 0.026                   | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 | 0.00092                 |

REGIONAL DIFFUSION TRIALS is the number of trials in the region (minus the trials in the receiving state) in the previous 5 years, defining regions as the Correlates of War project does. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A18: Language Diffusion of INITIATIONS

|                          | Any                       |                           |                             |                             | First                       |                             |                             |                             |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                          | All Model 1               | No J. Doe Model 2         | All Model 3                 | No J. Doe Model 4           | All Model 3                 | No J. Doe Model 4           | All Model 3                 | No J. Doe Model 4           |
| Migrant Stocks           | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)     |
| Language Diffusion Cases | -0.0000055<br>(0.0000029) | -0.0000055<br>(0.0000029) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) | -0.00000078<br>(0.00000078) |
| Observations             | 161213                    | 161213                    | 141403                      | 141403                      | 141403                      | 141403                      | 141403                      | 141403                      |
| $R^2$                    | 0.026                     | 0.026                     | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     | 0.00093                     |

LANGUAGE DIFFUSION CASES is the number of initiations in states that share an official language (minus the cases in the receiving state) in the last five years. Language data is from Graham and Tucker (2021). Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A19: Language Diffusion of TRIALS

|                           | Any                  |                      |                      | First                |                      |                      |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                           | All Model 1          | No J. Doe Model 2    | All Model 3          | No J. Doe Model 4    | All Model 3          | No J. Doe Model 4    |
| Migrant Stocks            | 0.00013** (0.000048) | 0.00013** (0.000048) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) |
| Language Diffusion Trails | -0.000065 (0.00013)  | -0.000065 (0.00013)  | 0.000036 (0.000027)  | 0.000036 (0.000027)  | 0.000036 (0.000027)  | 0.000036 (0.000027)  |
| Observations              | 161213               | 161213               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               |
| $R^2$                     | 0.026                | 0.026                | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              |

LANGUAGE DIFFUSION TRIALS is the number of trials in states that share an official language (minus the trials in the receiving state) in the last five years. Language data is from Graham and Tucker (2021). Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table A20: Legal Diffusion of INITIATIONS

|                       | Any                       |                           |                            | First                      |                            |                            |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|                       | All Model 1               | No J. Doe Model 2         | All Model 3                | No J. Doe Model 4          | All Model 3                | No J. Doe Model 4          |
| Migrant Stocks        | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.00013**<br>(0.000048)   | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)    | 0.000048*<br>(0.000022)    |
| Legal Diffusion Cases | -0.0000011<br>(0.0000015) | -0.0000011<br>(0.0000015) | 0.00000091<br>(0.00000050) | 0.00000091<br>(0.00000050) | 0.00000091<br>(0.00000050) | 0.00000091<br>(0.00000050) |
| Observations          | 161213                    | 161213                    | 141403                     | 141403                     | 141403                     | 141403                     |
| $R^2$                 | 0.026                     | 0.026                     | 0.00093                    | 0.00093                    | 0.00093                    | 0.00093                    |

LEGAL DIFFUSION CASES is the number of initiations in states that share the same legal system (minus the initiations in the receiving state) in the last five years. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A21: Legal Diffusion of TRIALS

|                        | Any                  |                      |                      |                      | First                |                      |                      |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                        | All Model 1          | No J. Doe Model 2    | All Model 3          | No J. Doe Model 4    | All Model 3          | No J. Doe Model 4    | All Model 3          | No J. Doe Model 4    |
| Migrant Stocks         | 0.00013** (0.000048) | 0.00013** (0.000048) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) | 0.000048* (0.000022) |
| Legal Diffusion Trails | 0.000046 (0.00011)   | 0.000046 (0.00011)   | -0.000014 (0.000062) | -0.000014 (0.000062) | -0.000014 (0.000062) | -0.000014 (0.000062) | -0.000014 (0.000062) | -0.000014 (0.000062) |
| Observations           | 161213               | 161213               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               | 141403               |
| $R^2$                  | 0.026                | 0.026                | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              | 0.00092              |

LEGAL DIFFUSION TRIALS is the number of trials in states that share the same legal system (minus the trials in the receiving state) in the last five years. Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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