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PS239: International Organizations
Course Syllabus
Fall 2014

Course description

This course will focus on contemporary rational choice accounts of international institutions. Each week's reading assignments will be posted on the class website.

Requirements

Over the quarter you must:

1. Serve as discussion leader for two meetings by providing a short (10—15 minute) overview of the week's readings, generating a set of discussion questions, and then leading the class discussion (30% of final grade)
2. Complete four written assignments for weeks that you are not a discussion leader (40% of final grade)
3. Actively participate in all class discussions, demonstrating that you have prepared and understand the assigned readings (30% of final grade)

Topics and reading

Part I: Conceptual Issues in International Cooperation

Week 1 (Oct 7): Anarchy and Institutions

(demand for institutions; Keohane and theory of the firm)

Assigned reading:

Institutions:

- Dixit, Avinash K. (2004) *Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance*. Princeton University Press. – Chapter 1.1-1.6 only (pp. 1—14)
- (*) North, Douglass C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press. – Chapter 1 only (pp. 3—10)

Early IO:

- (*) Keohane, Robert O. (1982) "The Demand for International Regimes." *International Organization* 36(2): 325-355.

- Krasner, Stephen D. (1982) "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization* 36(2): 185—205.

Overview of contemporary IO:

- Gilligan, Michael, and Leslie Johns. (2012) "Formal Models of International Institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (1): 221—243.

Supplemental reading:

- Calvert, Randall L. (1995) "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions." In *Explaining Social Institutions*, Jack Knight & Itai Sened (eds.) University of Michigan Press.
- Calvert, Randall L. (1995) "Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication." In *Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions*, Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric Allen Hanushek (eds.) Cambridge University Press.
- Coase, R. H. (1937) "The Nature of the Firm," *Economica* 4(16): 386—405.
- Dixit, Avinash K. (2004) *Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance*. Princeton University Press.
- (*) Keohane, Robert O. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.
- (*) North, Douglass C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.

Week 2 (Oct 14): Informal Governance

(reputation; soft law/custom/norms; elite pacts)

Assigned reading:

Reputation:

- (*) Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. (1990) "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2 (1): 1—23.
- Downs, George W., and Michael A. Jones. (2002) "Reputation, Compliance, and International Law." *Journal of Legal Studies* 31: S98—S114.
- (*) Keohane, Robert O. (1986) "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40: 1—27.

Soft law, custom, and norms:

- (*) Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. (2000) "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." *International Organization* 54: 421—456.
- Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. (1999) "A Theory of Customary International Law." *The University of Chicago Law Review* 66(4): 1113—1177.

Elite pacts (constitutions):

- Voeten, Erik. (2005) "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59(3): 527—557.
- Myerson, Roger B. (2008) "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 125—139.
- (*) Weingast, Barry R. (1997) "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91(2): 245—226.

Supplemental reading:

- Calvert, Randall L. (1992) "Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination." *International Political Science Review* 13: 7—24.
- Greif, Avner. (2006) *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith. (2008) *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change*. Princeton University Press.
- Mercer, Jonathan. (2010) *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press.
- Miller, William Ian. (1990) *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland*. University of Chicago Press.

Week 3 (Oct 21): Compliance

(paradigms: instrumental, managerial, and legitimacy)

Assigned reading:

- Simmons, Beth A. (2010) "Treaty Compliance and Violation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 273—296.
- (*) Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1996) "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3): 379—406.
- Dai, Xinyuan. (2005) "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59 (Spring): 363—398.
- Simmons, Beth A. (2000) "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94: 819—835.
- Von Stein, Jana. (2005) "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611—622.
- (*) Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1993) "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47: 175—205.
- Hurd, Ian. (1999) "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53(2): 379—408.

- Martin, Lisa L. (2013) "Against Compliance." In *International Law and International Relations: Synthesizing Insights from Interdisciplinary Scholarship*, Jeffrey L. Dunlop & Mark Pollack (eds.) Cambridge University Press.

Supplemental reading:

- (*) Henkin, Louis. (1968/1979) *How Nations Behave*. Council on Foreign Relations.
- Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1995) *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. Harvard University Press.

Week 4 (Oct 28): Distribution and Participation

(who benefits; who participates)

Assigned readings:

Distribution:

- (*) Fearon, James D. (1998) "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52 (2): 269—305.
- Blaydes, Lisa. (2004) "Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC." *International Organization* 58 (Spring): 213—237.
- Carnegie, Allison. (2014) "States Held Hostage: Political Hold Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 54—70.
- Guzman, Andrew T. (1998) "Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 38: 639—688.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. (2006) "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000." *International Organization* 60 (4): 811—846.

Participation (multilateralism):

- (*) Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1998) "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 52 (2): 397—419.
- Gilligan, Michael J. (2004) "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58 (Summer): 459—484.
- Johns, Leslie, and Krzysztof Pelc. (2014a) "Who Gets to Be in the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes." *International Organization* 68 (3): 663—699.
- Johns, Leslie, and Krzysztof Pelc. (2014b) "Fear of Crowds in WTO Disputes: Why Don't More Countries Participate?" Working paper.

Supplemental reading:

- Stone, Randall W. (2011) *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Part II: Impact and Functions of Specific Organizations

Week 5 (Nov 4): UN Security Council

(information transmission; legitimacy)

Assigned reading:

- Thompson, Alexander. (2006) "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60 (Winter): 1—34.
- Fang, Songying. (2008) "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 304—321.
- Chapman, Terrence. (2009) "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63(4): 733—764.
- Tingley, Dustin, and Michael Tomz. (2012) "How Does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?" Working Paper.
- Hurd, Ian. (2005) "The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003." *International Organization* 59(3): 495—526.

Supplemental reading:

- Voeten, Erik. (2001) "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95: 845—858.
- Chapman, Terrence. (2011) *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. University of Chicago Press.
- Chapman, Terrence, and Scott Wolford. (2010) "International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 72(1): 227—242.

Week 6 (Nov 11): NO CLASS (HOLIDAY)

Week 7 (Nov 18): International Trade

(flexibility/rigidity, domestic politics)

Assigned reading:

Rigidity/flexibility:

- Rosendorff, B. Peter. (2005) "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99: 389—400.
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. (2009) "Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements." *International Studies Quarterly* 53: 349—368.
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. (2008) "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62 (3): 477—505.
- Johns, Leslie. (2014) "Depth versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 26 (3): 468—495.

Domestic Politics:

- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. (2002) "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56 (3): 477—513.
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. (2013) "Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions." *International Organization* 67 (3): 629—655.
- Peritz, Lauren. (2014) "When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings." Working paper.

Supplemental reading:

- Brewster, Rachel. (2011) "The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement." *George Washington University Law Review* 80: 102—156.
- (*) Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. (1995) *Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations*. Princeton University Press.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. (2007) "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61: 37—67.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Helen V. Milner. (2012) *Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements*. Princeton University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. (2000) "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94: 305—322.

Week 8 (Nov 25): International Law and Courts

Assigned reading:

Overview of IL/IR

- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., David G. Victor and Yonatan Lupu. (2012) "Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field." *American Journal of International Law* 106: 47—97.

Purpose

- Allee, Todd L., and Paul K. Huth. (2006) "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review* 100: 219—234.
- Brewster, Rachel. (2004) "The Domestic Origins of International Agreements." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 44 (2): 501—544.
- Carrubba, Clifford J. (2005) "Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes." *Journal of Politics* 67 (3): 669—689.
- Johns, Leslie. (2012) "Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (2): 257-289.

Effectiveness

- Gilligan, Michael. (2006) "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime." *International Organization* 60: 935—967.
- Helfer, Laurence R., and Erik Voeten. (2014) "International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe." *International Organization* 68 (1): 77—110.

Evolution

- Alter, Karen J., and Laurence R. Helfer. (2010) "Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice." *International Organization* 64 (4): 563—592.
- Carrubba, Clifford J. (2009) "A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems." *Journal of Politics* 71: 55—69.

Supplemental reading:

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal. (2000) "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54: 401—419.
- Koremenos, Barbara. (2005) "Contracting around International Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 549—565.
- Posner, Eric and John Yoo. (2005) "Judicial Independence in International Tribunals." *California Law Review* 93: 1—74.
- Raustiala, Kal. (2005) "Form and Substance in International Agreements." *American Journal of International Law* 99: 581—614.

Week 9 (Dec 2): Human Rights

Assigned reading:

- Moravcsik, Andrew. (2000) "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *International Organization* 54 (2): 217—252.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. (2005) "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59 (3): 593—629.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Laurence R. Helfer, and Christopher J. Fariss. (2011) "Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties." *International Organization* 65 (4): 673—707.
- Helfer, Laurence R. (2002) "Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes." *Columbia Law Review* 102: 1832—1911.
- Hollyer, James R., and B. Peter Rosendorff. (2011) "Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6: 275—327.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. (2008) "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62: 65—101.

Supplemental reading:

- Simmons, Beth A. (2009) *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Week 10 (Dec 9): Peacekeeping and Election-monitoring

Assigned reading:

Election-monitoring

- Hyde, Susan D. (2007) "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *World Politics* 60 (1): 37—63.
- Hyde, Susan D. (2011) "Catch Us if You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Creation." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 356—369.
- Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. (2014) "Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation." *International Organization* 68(2): 329—359.
- Kelley, Judith. (2008) "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring." *International Organization* 62(2): 221—255.
- Simpson, Alberto, and Daniela Donno. (2012) "Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?" *Journal of Politics* 74(2): 501—513.

Peacekeeping

- Allen, Susan Hannah, and Amy T. Yuen. (Forthcoming) "The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2004a) "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269—292.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2004b) "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects." *World Politics* 56(4): 481—519.

Supplemental reading:

Election-monitoring

- Donno, Daniela. (2010) "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms." *International Organization* 64(4): 593—625.

Peacekeeping

- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2003) "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *International Organization* 57(2): 337—372.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2008) *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after War*. Princeton University Press.
- Hyde, Susan D. (2011) *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Cornell University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. (2000) "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 779—801.
- Gilligan, Michael J., and Stephen John Stedman. (2003) "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5(4): 37—54.
- Gilligan, Michael J., and Ernest J. Sergenti. (2008) "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3: 89—122.