

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Political Science 220A

Fall 2015

W 2-5p, 2121 Bunche Hall

<https://moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/15F-POLSCI220A-1>

Syllabus Vers. 0.9 (Draft, subject to revision)

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This is a graduate introduction to international relations theory. It is the first of a two-course sequence. The course is quite demanding. The readings are varied; they will introduce you not only to schools of thought but also to different methodologies, styles of research, substantive domains, etc. At the end, you will know a lot about international relations theory, but you will also have a good sense of what you don't know. You will be better able to choose the portions of the field you find appealing and the sets of skills you still need to attain in order to specialize in those areas.

There are different things that you may find disappointing. There are too many readings and not enough time adequately to discuss them all. We will never pay enough attention to those approaches you like; we will spend too much time on work you don't like. Some of you will be frustrated by the fact that no one particular approach is pushed in the course—you will want to be told where truth lies rather than be encouraged to tolerate ambiguity and accept the hyperpluralism of the field.

Think of the following questions as you read. What do the authors want to explain? What explains each phenomenon in question? What are the critical concepts? How are cause and effect observed? What kind of research design is employed? From what theoretical perspective does the argument originate? With whom are the authors engaged in debate?

You should think of yourselves as apprentices learning about a field and its practices. Although your primary focus is on the specific arguments developed in the works you read, you should keep an eye on as much else as possible. In what journals does work appear? Do different styles of work appear in different journals (some day you will be an author thinking about where to submit your work)? Who and what is cited? What distinguishes works you like from those that you don't? Are there any stylistic devices you like?

This is a draft syllabus, changes may be made and you will receive updates.

Course requirements: Participation and two short papers.

We expect you to come to each class session and to come prepared. Your participation is essential for the course to work. Not to prepare is to attempt to ride free on the efforts of others. You may be required to do in-class presentations. In addition, you will be required to write two short papers. They must be completed before the end of the quarter. They must not be submitted two weeks in a row; they must be spaced at least two weeks apart (that way, you will have the benefit of comments on prior papers). And you must not write on the same topic more than once. Note that the two papers entail somewhat different tasks—roughly corresponding to the essential components of scholarship.

Paper #1: 7-10 pages

This paper should be a critical review of one or more items assigned in the course. The critique should deal with theoretical and analytical issues rather than minor methodological ones. Examples: “author A argues that X causes Y but the material in the article make a more compelling case for the reverse causal argument”; “author A argues that X leads to Y but variable Z, which is never discussed (much less controlled for), seems

a more important causal factor”; “the concept Y is central to the arguments made by both scholars A and B, yet they use the term in quite distinct senses with compelling consequences for their respective arguments.” An example of a critique we do not want particularly to see: “the author’s measurement of power leaves something to be desired.” Deal with the heart of an argument.

You are encouraged to write about articles we have not yet discussed in class. DO NOT repeat arguments made in class if you do write about an article after we have discussed it.

Paper #2: 7-10 pages

Lay out an interesting puzzle or question and sketch how one might go about solving or answering it.

Alternatively, take off from one or more pieces you have read to develop a hypothesis of your own. This could be an elaboration, extension, or different application of another’s argument.

We are prepared to accept alternative paper topics, but you must clear them with us in advance.

Course Topics:

1. Anarchy, Power, and the Balance of Power
2. International System and International Society
3. Strategic Choice and War
4. Economics and War
5. Military Doctrine, Grand Strategy, and Weapons
6. Domestic Politics and War
7. Domestic Institutions and Individual Decision-making

Tentative Topics for PS220B (winter 2016):

1. Failed States and Terrorism
2. Networks
3. Crossing Borders I (Trade, Investment, Money)
4. Crossing Borders II (Migration, Transnational Advocacy, Human Rights)
5. International Institutions
6. Dispute Settlement and International Law
7. Intervention (Peacekeeping, Election-monitors, etc.)

1 Introductory Meeting (Sept. 30)

2 Anarchy, Power, and the Balance of Power (Oct. 7)

2.1 Anarchy, Power and Order

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1986. Political structures and anarchic orders and balances of power. In *Neorealism and its critics*. Ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 70-130.

Conybeare, John A. C. 1980. International organization and the theory of property rights. *International Organization* 34: 307-34.

Elman, Colin and Michael A. Jensen. 2014. Introduction. In *Realism Reader*, edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, 1-30. New York: Routledge.

2.2 Balance of Power

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. Peace, war, and the balance of power. *American Political Science Review* 88 (September): 593-607.

Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. Testing balance-of-power theory in world history. *European Journal of International Relations* 13(2): 155-185.
SKIM

2.3 Alliances

Young, O. R. 1976. Rationality, coalition formation, and international relations. In *Rationality and social sciences*, eds. S. I. Benn, and G. W. Mortimore, 223-45. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Walt, Stephen M. 1985. Alliance formation and the balance of power. *International Security* 9: 3-43.
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Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics* 36(4): 461-495.

Olson, Mancur, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An economic theory of alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48: 266-79. Reprinted in *Economic theories of international politics*, ed. Bruce M. Russett, and in *Alliance in international politics*, ed. Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen.

Morrow, James D. 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science* 904-933.

Morrow, James D. 2000. Alliances: Why Write Them Down. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 63-83.

Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds (2014) To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances. *International Organization* 68: 775-809.

3 International System and International Society (Oct. 14)

3.1 International System

Jervis, Robert. 1979. Systems theories and diplomatic history. In *Diplomacy: new approaches in history, theory, and policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, 212-44. New York: Free Press.

3.2 Diffusion

Solingen, Etel. 2012. Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (4): 631-644.

3.3 Hegemonic Stability

Organski, A. F. K. 1968. The power transition. In *World Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 338-76. skim

Stein, Arthur A. 1984. The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order. *International Organization* 38 (Spring): 355-386.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Limits of hegemonic stability theory. *International Organization* 39 (Autumn): 579-614.

Lake, David A. 2009. Hobbesian Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 263-283.

Gunitsky, Seva. 2014. From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century. *International Organization* 68 (3): 561-597.

3.4 International Society

Buzan, Barry, David Held, and Anthony McGrew. 1998. Realism vs cosmopolitanism: a debate. *Review of International Studies* 24 (July): 387-98.

Buzan, Barry. 1993. From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school. *International Organization* 47 (Summer): 327-52.

4 Strategic Choice and War (Oct. 21)

Lake, David A., and Robert Powell. 1999. International relations: a strategic-choice approach. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, ed. David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, 3-38. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Morrow, James D. 1999. The strategic setting of choices: signaling, commitment, and negotiation in international politics. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, ed. David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, 77-114. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

4.1 Cooperation Under Anarchy

Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The emergence of cooperation among egoists. *American Political Science Review* 75: 306-18.

4.2 Rational Wars

Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization* 49: 379-414.

Reiter, Dan. 2004. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. *Perspectives on Politics* 1: 27-43.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2000. Rationalist Explanations for War? *Security Studies* 10(1): 143-50.

Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a commitment problem. *International Organization* 60(1): 169-203.

Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli. 2009. The Reasons for Wars: an Updated Survey. In *Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, edited by Chris Coyne. Elgar Publishing, revised typescript, December.

Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. *World Economics* 1: 145-166

Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *International Organization* 52: 269-305.

Stein, Arthur A. 1999. The limits of strategic choice: constrained rationality and incomplete explanation. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, ed. David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, 197-228. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

5 Economics and War (Oct. 29)

5.1 Economic Interests and Foreign Policy

Kurth, James R. 1979. The political consequences of the product cycle: industrial policy and political outcomes. *International Organization* 33 (Winter): 1-34.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1994. International investment and colonial control: a new interpretation. *International Organization* 48 (Autumn): 559-93.

5.2 Interdependence and the Economic Bases of Peace

Cooper, Richard N. 1972. Economic interdependence and foreign policy in the seventies. *World Politics* 24: 159-81.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. *Power and interdependence: world politics in transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 3-37.

Stein, Arthur A. 1993. Governments, economic interdependence, and international cooperation. In *Behavior, society, and international conflict*, ed. Philip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilly, 241-324. New York: Oxford University Press, for the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. Read pp. 241-255, 265-280, 290-291.

Stein, Arthur A. 2003. Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes. In *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate*, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins, 111-126. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

North, Douglass, and Robert Thomas. 1970. An economic theory of the growth of the Western world. *Economic History Review* 2nd series, 23: 1-17. Skim

5.3 Economic Sanctions

Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions *World Politics* 45 (3): 406-432.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion *International Organization* 57 (3): 643-659.

Stein, Arthur A. 2012. Sanctions, Inducements, and Market Power: Political Economy of International Influence. In *Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation*, edited by Etel Solingen, 29-55. New York: Cambridge University Press.

6 Military Doctrine, Grand Strategy, and Weapons (Nov. 4)

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 58-113.

6.1 Sources and Implications of Military Doctrine

Posen, Barry. 1984. Explaining Military Doctrine. In *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 34-80.

6.2 Grand Strategy: Appeasement, Engagement, Deterrence, Containment, Rollback, Offshore balancing

Treisman, Daniel. 2004. Rational Appeasement. *International Organization* 58(2): 345-373.

6.3 Military Strategy: Attrition, Envelopment, Airpower

Reiter, Dan and Curtis Meek. 1999. Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2): 363-387.

Horowitz, Michael and Dan Reiter. 2001. When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 147-173.

Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Stephen Long. 2012. Civil War Intervention and the Problem of Iraq. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 85-98.

6.4 Who Wins Wars?

Lake, David A. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. *American Political Science*

Review 86(1): 24–37.

Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Introduction. In *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–13.

6.5 The Nuclear Revolution

Powell, Robert. 1985. The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. *Political Science Quarterly* 100(1): 75–96.

Rauchhaus, Robert. 2009. Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: a Quantitative Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(2): 258–277.

Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail. *International Organization* 67 (1): 173–195.

6.6 Nuclear Proliferation

Sagan, Scott D. 2011. The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. *Annual review of political science* 14: 225–244.

Kroenig, Matthew. 2014. Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy. *Security Studies* 23 (1): 1–32.

7 Veterans Day (no class, Nov. 11)

8 Domestic Politics and War (Nov. 18)

8.1 Political Stability

Katzenstein, Peter. 1977. Conclusion: domestic structures and strategies of foreign economic policy. *International Organization* 31 (Autumn): 879-920.

Gordon, Michael. 1974. Domestic conflict and the origins of the First World War. *Journal of Modern History* 46 (June): 191-226.

Lamborn, Alan C. 1985. Risk and foreign policy choice. *International Studies Quarterly* 29: 385-410.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2012. Domestic Explanations of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 161–181.

8.2 Regime Type: Democracies and Autocracies (Regime Security and Democratic Peace)

Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Liberalism and world politics. *American Political Science Review* 80 (December): 1151-69.

Gowa, Joanne. 1995. Democratic states and international disputes. *International Organization* 49 (Summer): 511-22.

- Ferejohn, John, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 2008. Warlike Democracies. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 3-38.
- Gartzke, Erik and Alex Weisiger. 2013. Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(1): 171-185
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. *International Organization* 53: 233-66.
- Solingen, Etel. 2007. Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The foundations of war and peace in East Asia and the Middle East. *American Political Science Review* 101 (November): 757-780.

8.3 Domestic Audiences

- Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88 (September): 577-92.
- Snyder, Jack and Erica D. Borghard. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 437-456.
- Kenneth A. Schultz. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (1): 32-60
- Trager, Robert, F. and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. The political costs of crisis bargaining: Presidential rhetoric and the role of party. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 526-545.

9 Thanksgiving (no class, Nov. 25)

10 Domestic Institutions and Individual Decision-making (Dec. 2)

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1999. Institutions as constraints on strategic choice. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, ed. David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, 115-36. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

10.1 Bureaucratic Politics

- Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. Rethinking Allison's models. *American Political Science Review* 86: 301-22.

10.2 Organizational Culture

- Legro, Jeffrey W. 1996. Culture and preferences in the international cooperation Two-step. *American Political Science Review* 90: 118-37.

10.3 Public Opinion

- Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B. K. Potter. 2008. The relationships between mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 39-65.

10.4 Issue Areas

Lowi, Theodore J. 1967. Making democracy safe for the world: national politics and foreign policy. In *Domestic sources of foreign policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau, 295-331. Reprinted in *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, 1979).

10.5 Individuals as Actors

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1999. Actors and preferences in international relations. in *Strategic choice and international relations*, eds. David A. Lake and Robert Powell, 39-76. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The war trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 11-18.

10.6 Personality

Etheridge, Lloyd. 1978. Personality effects on American foreign policy, 1898-1968: a test of interpersonal generalization theory. *American Political Science Review* 72: 434-51.

10.7 Cognitive Process

Snyder, Jack L. 1978. Rationality at the brink: the role of cognitive processes in failures of deterrence. *World Politics* 30: 345-65.

Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. *American economic review* 93(5): 1449-1475.

10.8 Experience

Chiozza, Giacomo, and H. E. Goemans. 2004. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still ex post inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 604-619.

10.9 Belief Systems

Renshon, Jonathan. 2008. Stability and change in belief systems: the operational code of George W. Bush. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(6): 820-849.

10.10 Intuition

Tetlock, Philip E. 2005. Quantifying the Unquantifiable. In *Expert Political Judgment*, 1-24.

10.11 Crisis Situations

Hermann, Charles F. 1969. International crisis as a situational variable. In *International politics and foreign policy*, 2nd edn., ed. James N. Rosenau, 409-21. New York: Free Press.